

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. WDW-3957

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

AUG 3 1954

TO : Chief, []

DATE _____

FROM : Chief, W

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational / STURMANT
SPECIFIC - Future Use of STURMANT-1

KEY : WDW-3957, 2 July 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

1. In order that Headquarters may be in a position to offer more adequate and timely support to [] plans for STURMANT-1, it is requested that, pending submission of the JPOF, Headquarters be advised of the [] general thinking relative to the operational utilization of STURMANT-1 while in the United States and after completion of his period of study.
2. Has the [] considered attempting to obtain a visa for STURMANT-1 under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Public Law 203)? Pertinent extracts are included in the referenced dispatch. STURMANT-1 might be eligible under Section 4 (a) paragraphs (21) and (22). In any event, no matter what program or method is used, STURMANT-1 will still have difficulty in obtaining a visa. As we understand it, the Consul has full responsibility in the issuance of visas, and requires, usually, (a) a birth certificate for the individual making application for a visa, (b) a police certificate, certifying that the applicant has no criminal record; and in other cases where the applicant has a family, a marriage certificate and birth certificates for the applicant's spouse and children. Although the relationships may be such at present that the Consul may be prevailed upon to issue a visa with little or no documentation, such a development would seem to be highly improbable. It is possible that KINBARK could supply STURMANT-1 with the necessary documentation but in the event such authentication were unsuccessful he would still be obtaining the visa fraudulently, and if he were to come to this country, and the fraud later proven, then he would be deported forthwith.
3. There are only two possibilities that remain for STURMANT-1 to enter this country legally:
 - a. Under KINBARK sponsorship -- this method requires extensive field justification and is closely administered.

[] (Coordinating officer) []

[] (Authenticating officer)

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- b. STREANT-1 could go to the Japanese (after a thorough security briefing) and admit his true identity. He could explain his documentation by stating that he wanted to return to Japan immediately after World War II, but inasmuch as he was listed as a war criminal by the Chinese - and he was listed as such, he was afraid that on his return to Japan, during the occupation, he would be turned over to the Chinese and prosecuted for his alleged wartime activities. He could go further and state that OGIWAKI employed him because of his background and experience, brought him back to Japan and documented him as he was because of his fears of prosecution by the Chinese. It may be possible for the [] to request a letter from OGIWAKI stating that STREANT-1 performed valuable services for them during the post-war years and that they required his continued employment during the Korean War because of his highly specialized background in Inner Asian languages and culture. It is felt that within a short period of time STREANT-1 might be accepted by the Japanese and be able to operate under his true identity, albeit, not without intensive questioning by the Japanese Intelligence Service. After STREANT-1 admitted his true identity and had been accepted by the Japanese, PEPRIN could support him openly, e.g., a grant from a research foundation, under which he could perform research on a topic, within his sphere of competence, which would be of benefit either to the Japanese government or to private Japanese organizations (universities, etc.). STREANT-1 could then apply for, and probably receive, further study in this country in a perfectly legal status with the backing of some Japanese research or scholarly group. Headquarters will investigate the requirements of the various foundations for research grants, if the [] expresses any interest in this type of a program.
- c. As an alternative STREANT-1 could stay on in some capacity with the [] perhaps as an interpreter, although he probably would not be amenable to this suggestion. If he did decide to remain and were to admit his true identity to the Japanese, the latter, in all probability, would attempt to use him as a source of information regarding PEPRIN activities. If he did not admit his identity he would be faced with delaying a situation that must be faced sooner or later.
- d. Your comments on the preceding paragraphs are requested.

29 July 1954

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